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The Difficulty of Faking Data
 
Theodore P. Hill 
Most people have preconceived 
notions of randomness that often dif­
fer substantially from true random­
ness. A classroom favori te is the 
counterintuitive fact that, in a ran­
domly selected group of 23 people, 
the probability is bigger than 50% 
that at least two share the same birth­
day. A more serious example concern­
ing "false-positives" in medical testing 
is this: Suppose that a person is 
selected at random from a large pop­
ulation of which 1% are drug users 
and that a drug test is administered 
which is 98% reliable (i.e., drug users 
test positive with probability .98, and 
nonusers test negative with probabil­
ity .98). The somewhat surprising 
fact is that, if the test result is posi­
tive, then the person tested is never­
theless more than twice as lilzely to be 
a nonuser than a user. Similar surpris­
es concerning unexpected properties 
of truly random datasets make it dif­
ficult to fabricate numerical data suc­
cessfully. 
Misperceptions of 
Randomness 
To demonstrate this to beginning stu­
dents of probability, I often ask them to 
do the following homework assign­
ment the first day. TIley are either to 
flip a coin 200 times and record the 
results or merely pretend to flip a coin 
and fake the results. The next day I 
amaze them by glancing at each stu­
dent's list and correctly separating 
nearly all the true from the faked data. 
The fact in this case is that in a truly 
random sequence of 200 tosses it is 
extremely likely that a run of SLX heads 
or six tails will occur (the exact proba­
bility is somewhat complicated to cal­
culate), but the average person trying 
to fake such a sequence will rarely 
include runs of that length. 
This is but one example of the well­
documented observation that most 
people cannot generate truly random 
numerical data. A study published in 
1953 by psychologist A. Chapanis 
describes his experiment in which 
subjects were asked to write out long 
sequences of numbers (digits 0 
through 9) in random order. His 
results showed that different individu­
als exhibit marked preferences for cer­
tain decimal digits, and that repetitive 
pairs or triplets such as 222, 333 are 
avoided, whereas preferred triplets 
usually are made up of digits all of 
which are different - for example, 
653 or 231. This tendency to avoid 
long runs and include too many alter­
nations, as in my class demonstration, 
has been confirmed by many 
researchers. Most recently it has 
played a role in the arguments of cog­
nitive psychologists Gilovich, Vallone, 
and Tversky (1985) that the "hot 
hand:' in basketball is nothing more 
than a popular misperception because 
long streaks in truly random data are 
much more .likely to occur than is 
commonly believed. 
Such misperceptions of random­
ness of data can be capitalized on. In 
the Massachusetts Numbers Game, 
players bet on a four-digit number of 
their choice, after which a four-digit 
number is selected at random (by com­
puter or mechanical device), and those 
who had bct on the winning number 
share the tax-depleted pot equally. At 
first glance it seems to many people 
that any four-digit number is as good as 
any other, but a moment's reflection 
reveals that numbers such as 1776 or 
1960 are probably more likely to be bet 
on than numbers such as 7716 or 
9061. Since all four-digit numbers are 
equally likely to be winners, it is there­
fore desirable to bet on numbers that 
very few other people choose because 
when such numbers win their owners 
will not have to share the pot with 
many other people. Several years after 
the Massachusetts N umbers Game 
began operating in 1976, M.LT. statis­
tician H. Chernoff used newspaper 
announcements of the winning num­
bers and payoffs to empirically deter­
mine lists of numbers with positive 
expected payoffs. 
[His 1981 article also contained a 
"birthday-problem" calculation to 
show that the probability of no dupli­
cation of a four-digit number in 500 
random trials is about .000003, where­
as an article in the Boston Globe giving 
an update of the Game reported that, 
as was to be expected (since there are 
10,000 possible numbers), none of the 
first 500 randomly selected four-digit 
numbers had been repeated. In a letter 
to the Editor, the Commissioner of the 
State Lottery con'ected the original 
report, pointing out that there had 
been several duplications in the short 
history of the game.] 
True Versus
 
Fabricated Data
 
Determining whether real numelical 
data have been fabricated or altered is 
often of great importance - in verify­
ing e>"'Perimental scientific data, such 
as medical trials, on which crucial 
decisions depend; in census data that 
helps determine political boundaries 
and governmental subsidies; in tax­
return data submitted to the IRS by 
individuals and corporations. The var­
ied techniques used in detection of 
fraud or fabrication include both deter­
ministic and statistical methods. 
One example of a deterministic 
method is analysis of round-off 
approximations. In an article on 
rounding percentages in 1979 in the 
Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, p. 363, statisticians P. 
Diaconis and D. Freedman's analysis 
of numerical data in a well-known 
paper 
raises the suspicion that [the author] 
manipulated the data to make the rows 
round properly. This suspicion is not 
hard to verify. . .. The percentage of 
numbers with leading digit 7 is reported 
as 5.5, with a total of 335 cases. The 
only proportions compatible with 5.5 are 
18/335, which rounds to 5.4, or 19/335, 
which rounds to 5.7. There is no pro­
portion possible that rounds to 5.5. 
The remainder of this article will 
focus on statistical methods for detect­
ing fake data, and the general idea 
behind such tests is quite simple: 
Identify properties of numerical 
datasets (of particular types) that are 
(a) highly likely to occur in true 
datasets of that type and (b) highly 
unlikely to occur in fabricated datasets 
of that type. 
The earlier example of using the 
pattern "runs of six or longer" to 
detect faked data in strings of 200 
coin tosses is exactly such a test, and 
of course many other similar tests are 
available. One of the newer tests cur­
rently being used is based on a cen-
Table 1 - Eighteen Stocks with Dollar Values
 
Approximately Satisfying Benford's law
 
Conversion to other currencies (such as pesos) or taking reciprocals both closely 
retain significant digit frequencies. 
Stock $/Stock Pesos/Stock Stocks/$ 
A 11 77 .091 
B 12 84 .083 
C 14 98 .071 
D 16 112 .063 
E 18 126 .056 
F 19 133 .053 
G 21 147 .048 
H 24 168 .042 
I 28 196 .036 
J 33 231 .030 
K 37 259 .027 
L 42 294 .024 
M 47 329 ..021 
N 55 385 .018 
0 64 448 .016 
P 71 497 .014 
Q 83 581 .012 
R 96 672 .010 
First Digit Frequencies 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 
$/Stock 6 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
 
Pesos/Stock 6 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
 
Stocks/$ 5 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
 
tury-old observation called Benford's	 cian S. Newcomb in 1881) predicts 
law, or the significant-digit law.	 that a number chosen at random has 
leading significant digit I with prob­
ability Jog lo 2 == .30 I, leading signifi­
cant digit 2 with probabilityBenford's Law 
loglo (3/2) == .176, and so on monot­
The significant-digit law is the empiri­ onically down to probability .046 for 
cal observation that in many naturally leading digit 9. The corresponding 
occurring tables of numerical data, the Jaws for second and higher signifi­
leading significant (nonzero) digit is cant digits, and their joint distribu­
not uniformly distributed in {I,2, ... ,9} tions is 
as might be expected, but instead Pr(D) = dl>" .,Dk = d,J
obeys the law 
Pr(first significant digit = d) = 10glo[1 + (td; X 10k-;)-I] 
=loglO(1 + }),d= 1,2, .. ,9. 
for d l E {I ,2, ... ,9} and dj E {O,l ,2, ... ,9}, 
Thus, this law (apparently first dis­	 j > I. This says for example, that the 
covered by astronomer/mathemati-	 probability that the first three signifi-
Table 2 - All Non-Benford Distributions Have Difference
 
Significant-Digit Frequencies When Converted To Other
 
Monetary Units
 
These 18 stocks are uniformly distributed in dollars (and significant digits), but the 
frequencies change radically when converted to pesos or reciprocal units. 
Stock $/Stock Pesos/Stock Stocks/$ 
A 10 70 .100 
B 15 105 '.067 
C 20 140 .050 
D 25 175 .040 
E 30 210 .033 
F 35 245 .028 
G 40 280 .025' 
H 45 315 .022 
I 50 350 .020 
J 55 385 .018 
K 60 420 .017 
L 65 455 .015 
M 70 490 .014 
N 75 525 .013 
0 80 560 .013 
P 85 595 .012 
Q 90 630 .011 
R 95 665 .011 
First Digit Frequencies 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 
$/Stock 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
 
Pesos/Stock 3 3 3 3 3 2 1 0 0
 
Stocks/$ 10 4 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
 
cant digits of a number are 3, 1, 4, 
respectively, P((D,'o2,D3) = (3,1,4)), 
is equal to Jog lo (I + 'i'h) == .0014. 
This logarithmic distribution is the 
only distribution on the significant 
digits of real numbers that is invari­
ant under changes of scale. That is, if 
you calculate the probabilities of par­
ticular leading significant digits (such 
as P((DI,D 2 ,D 3) = (3,1,4)), then 
these logarithmic probabilities 
remain unchanged when the underly­
ing dataset is multiplied by 2 or by 1T, 
or under any other change of scale 
(e.g., from English to metric units), 
and they are the only probabilities 
with that invariance property. For 
example, if the distribution of the sig­
nificant digits of a particular dataset 
such as stock prices is (close to) the 
Benford distribution, then conver­
sion from dollars per stock to pesos 
per stock will preserve the frequen­
cies of the significant digits (Table 1), 
whereas all non-Benford distribu­
tions will not (Table 2). 
Clearly the naive guess that the 
leading digits are equally likely to be 
one of the numbers {l,2, ... ,9} does 
not exhibit scale invariance because 
multiplication by 2, for example, 
converts all numbers starting with 5, 
6, 7, 8, or 9 into numbers starting 
with 1. This implies that P(D I = 1) 
must equal P(D I = 5) + P(D I = 
6) + P(D I = 7) + P(D J = 8) + 
P(D I = 9) for scale-invariance 
under multiplication by 2 to hold, 
which is certainly not true if P(D I = 
k) is the same for all k. (The proof 
that the logarithmic distribution is 
the only scale-invariant distribution 
on the significant digits is based on 
the fact that the orbit of every point 
under irrational rotation on the cir­
cle is asymptotically uniformly dis­
tributed) The logarithmic distribu­
tion is also the only probability dis­
tribution that is invariant under 
change of base - for example, if the 
underlying dataset is converted from 
base 10 to base 100 or vice versa. 
The formal statement and proof of 
this~ fact is somewhat deeper. 
111ese scale- and base-invariance 
characterizations of the logarithmic 
distribution, however clean mathe­
matically, do not explain the wide­
spread appearance of the distribution 
in real data because that simply 
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Figure 1. Benford's law predicts a decreasing frequency of first digits, from 1 through 9. The frequencies in datasets developed 
by Benford for numbers appearing on the front pages of newspapers, by Mark Nigrini of 3,141 county populations in the 1990 
U.S. Census, and by Eduardo Ley of the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1918-93 follows Benford's law (the numbers given 
atop each set of columns) within 2%. 
changes the question of "why logarith­
mic?" to "why scale-invariant?" In tlY­
ing to understand the prevalence of 
the logarithmic distribution in many 
real datasets, J noticed that tables that 
most dosely fit the log distribution are 
composite samples from various distri­
butions. Using the scale- and base­
invariance ideas together with modern 
probability tools such as constructions 
of random measures, it was not diffi­
cult to show that if random samples 
are taken from random distributions 
(in a "neutral" way), then the frequen­
cies of the leading significant digits of 
the combined sample will always con­
verge to Benford's law. One possible 
intuitive explanation is this. If a single 
distribution is picked at random, then 
it is certain (with probability 1) to be 
scale-dependent, but sampling from 
different distributions and combining 
the data tends to neutralize the depen­
dence on the scales, hence leading to 
the only scale-invariant distribution, 
Benford's law. 
Empirical Evidence 
of Benford's Law 
In 1881, Newcomb explained that his 
discovery of the significant-digit law 
was motivated by an observation that 
the pages of a book of logarithms 
were dirtiest in the beginning and 
progressively cleaner throughout. In 
1938 General Electric physicist F. 
Benford rediscovered the law based 
on this same observation, and went 
on to spend several years collecting 
data from sources as different as 
atomic weights, baseball statistics, 
numerical data from Reader's Digest, 
and areas of rivers. Newcomb's article 
having been long forgotten, Benford's 
name came to be associated with the 
significant-digit law. Since then, 
Benford's law has been found to be a 
very good fit to such varied sets as 
stock-market data (Dow Jones, 
Standard and Poor), 1990 census 
populations of the 3,141 counties in 
the Unitcd States, and numbers 
appearing in newspapers (see Fig. I). 
Thus there is evidence that many 
classes of true datasets follow 
Benford's law, and in many of those 
classes, such as stock-market tables, 
census data, and numbers gleaned 
from newspaper articles, a plausible 
theoretical explanation for the 
appearance of the logarithmic distrib-
ution is the random-samples-from-
random-distributions theorem. 
Detection of Fraud 
Using Benford's Law 
Another class of datasets that has 
recently been found to be a good fit 
to Benford's law is true tax data. 
According to accounting Professor 
M. Nigrini's 1996 article in the 
Journal of the American Taxation 
Association, the IRS's own model files 
for the line items "Interest Paid" and 
"Interest Received" indicate that the 
significant digits for these items are 
an exceedingly close fit to Benford's 
Table 3 -
law in true tax data (Table 3). Nigrini 
had substantial evidence that in most 
fabricated tax data, however, the sig-
nificant digits are not close to 
Benford, and his article described a 
goodness-of-fit-to-Benford test to 
help identify fraudulent financial 
data. This test is a partial negative 
test, in that conformity does not nec-
essarily imply true data, but noncon-
formity indicates some level of suspi-
cion. 
The Wall Street Journal Quly 10, 
1995) reported that the chief financial 
investigator for the district attorney's 
office in Brooklyn, N.Y., Mr. R. Burton, 
used [Nigrini's] program to analyze 784 
checks issued by seven companies and 
found that check amounts on 103 
checks didn't conform to expected pat-
terns [see Table 3]. "Bingo, that means 
fraud," says Mr. Burton. The district 
attorney has since caught the culprits, 
some bookkeepers and payroll clerks, 
and is charging them with theft. 
Since then, according to a recent arti-
cle in the Nel,ll York Times (August 4, 
1998), 
The income tax agencies of several 
nations and several states, including 
California, are using detection soft-
ware based on Ben ford's Law, as are a 
score of large companies and account-
ing businesses. 
With the current exponentially 
increasing availability of digital data 
and computing power, the trend 
toward use of subtle and powerful 
statistical tests for detection of fraud 
and other fabricated data is also cer-
tain to increase dramatically. 
Benford's law is only the beginning. 
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Benford's law Test for Fraudulent Data 
The Benford's law row contains the logarithmic frequencies of s'ignificant digit,>, the true tax data row is from IRS files, and 
the fraudulent data row is from the Brooklyn District Attorney's investigation of seven companies. Note that the fraudulent 
data have fewer leading digits 1,2, and 3 than the true tax data and Benford's law and many more leading digits 5 and 6. 
1 2 3 
Benford's Law 30.1 17.6 12.5 
True Tax Data 30.5 17.8 12.6 
Fraudulent Data 0 1.9 0 
First Digit Frequencies (%) 
4 5 6 
9.7 7.9 6.7 
9.6 7.8 6.6 
9.7 61.2 23.3 
7 8 9 
5.8 5.1 4.6 
5.6 5.0 4.5 
1.0 2.9 0 
